Herman Melville and Paul Tillich: An Ontological Interpretation of Billy Budd by Gress, Michael E.
Eastern Illinois University
The Keep
Masters Theses Student Theses & Publications
1980
Herman Melville and Paul Tillich: An Ontological
Interpretation of Billy Budd
Michael E. Gress
Eastern Illinois University
This research is a product of the graduate program in English at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more
about the program.
This is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses
by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gress, Michael E., "Herman Melville and Paul Tillich: An Ontological Interpretation of Billy Budd" (1980). Masters Theses. 3083.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/3083
PAPER CERTIFICATE #2 
TO: Graduate Degree Candidates who have written formal theses. 
SUBJECT: Permission to reproduce theses. 
I 
The University Library is receiving a number of requests from other 
institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion 
in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we 
feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained 
from the aulhor before we allow theses to be copied. 
Please sign one of the following statements: 
Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend 
my thes is to a reput~ble college or university for the purpose of copying 
it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings. 
I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not 




Herman Melville and Paul Ti]]icb: An 
-
Ontological Interpretation of Billy~ 
(TITLE) 
BY 
Michael E. Gress 
-z,..-. 
THESIS 
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
M.A. in English 




I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING 
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE 
I ~ 1,10 
DATE 
Herman Melville and raul Tillich: An 
Ontological Interpretation of Dilly Budd 
By 
Michael E. Gress 
B. A. in l'hilosophy, Eastern Illinois University, 1977 
ABS1'RACT OF A TliESIS 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Arts in English at the Graduate 
School of Eastern Illinois University 
CHARLES1'0J4-~~LI NO IS 
( 1980 / . 
·-· 
The traditional approaches to Herman Melville's Billy Budd 
focus upon the question of whether or not the story was Me lville's 
final statement of acceptance or irony. Both arguments arc 
sociological in nature in that the different sides argue that 
Melville either finally accepts or continues to reject by irony, 
the forms of society. The acceptance critics contend that Melville 
ends by seeing value in the forms because of their use for 
maintaining order in society; the irony critics claim that Melville 
was taking a final satirical poke at society's limiting forms and 
authority. 
Ny thesis differs from these traditional arguments because 
I treat the story and the actions of Captain Vere ontologically 
rather than sociologically. Using Paul Tillich's description of 
man found in The Courage To Be, I interpret Vere according to 
Tillich's three types of ontological anxiety. According to Tillich, 
all men suffer from the three types of anxiety due to a lack of an 
ultimate concern, though men find concerns that they take to be 
ultimate in spite of the fact that they are not . I argue in my 
thesis that Vere is a perfect example of a man who suddenly 
experiences ontological anxiety when he loses his spiritual center 
which is dependent upon a concern which is not ultimate. Vere, 
being a representative of 18th century, aristocratic society, 
places great faith in the order of the world. He manages to 
protect himself against threats to his fn.ith until the "innocent" 
Billy suddenly kills the "evil" Claggart. 'fhe actions of Billy 
and the death of Claggart shock Vere's faith and his spiritua l 
center, and his actions which follow, including the drum-he a d 
court and the hanging of Billy, fit neatly the description of a 
man suffering from ontological anxiety. 
By using Tillich to interpret Billy Budd , I believe that the 
story is made artistically better because tl1c reader is better able 
to understand Ver e 's situation because his experience is existential , 
i.e., the experience of anxiety is one whicl1 we all face due to the 
fact that we al l participate in being. Also, by using this 
interpretation, the story becomes a tribute to the insight of 
Melville and his ability to understand and to write about man's 
s.tate of being. 
I 
The traditional critical approaches to Melville's Billy Budd 
focus on the argument about whether Melville was writing a final 
1 testament of acceptance or a final ironic criticism of authority 
1. 
and the forms or structures of the world. 2 Those who argue for 
acceptance believe Melville approved of Vere's actions, and those 
who argue for irony believe .Melville t hought Billy wa s innocent and 
Vere punished him unjustly. Peter Still makes this distinction in 
his article "Herman Melville's Billy Budd: Sympathy and Rebellion." 
"This interpretation [ acceptance] of Billy Budd clearly sees 
Melville as sympathizing with Captain Vere, even s~es him identifying 
with Vere's point of view, while the first interpretation [!rony, 
rejection, rebellio~ tends to see Melville identifying with Billy 
a gainst Vere. 113 In either case, the main concern of these 
arguements centers a round the rules and authority of society; the 
critics treat the story as a social study in which Nelville opts 
either to accept society and its authority, or to continue to rebel 
against the forms that society imposes on man and uses to tyrannize 
h . 4 im. 
For the most part, 5 the main argument of the critics who see 
Billy Budd as .Melville's statement of acceptance is that Melville 
sanctions Vere's actions because Vere sees value in order and form 
and opposes rebellion and anarchy in society. There are slight 
variations on this theme, but all of the arguments arc built on 
this basic notion. E. L. Grant Watson was t he fir s t to emphasize 
Melville's shift from rebellion to acceptance, and his a rgument 
was expanded by such writers as Wendell Glick and William Braswell 
who argue that Vere is correct in acting as he docs because by 
hanging Billy he acts practically to save society as a whole. 
Edward Rosenberry argues similarly by writing that Vere acts 
according to the law because it is the law which saves society 
from the Hobbesian state of nature. 
2. 
The ironists, once again for the most part, 6 argue against the 
actions of Captain Vere. They insist that Melville uses Vere's 
character to display the dangers and evil of the traditional forms 
of authority. Based on such evidence as Melville's past works like 
White Jacket, in which he displays his satrical and rebellious 
contempt for the injustices of authority, or on Billy's final 
blessing of Captain Vere which they see as ironic, or on the 
reaction of the crew following Billy's death, they see the story as 
a continuation of Melville's rebellion. 7 Joseph Schiffman, arguing 
from an ironic reading, bases his theory of irony on the blessing, 
which he sees as the greatest irony of the story, and he charges 
Vere with completing Claggart's work. Leonard Casper and Phil 
Withim also see Vere as a Claggart who puts Billy to death because 
of his narrow views in which he believes service to the King more 
important than serving nature. Both Withim and Oliver Snyder, 
basing their arguments on the preface's praise of the French 
Revolution, believe that Melville was advocating rebellion against 
the past aristocratic structures which deny lower classes of any 
authority or freedom. Karl Zink emphasizes Melville's social 
criticism strongly when he writes that Vere ''defends the harshness 
of the social code as ultimately best for the common good." He 
continues by writing that Vere symbolizes the "awful power and 
blind impersonality of the forms," and he ends his article by 
claiming that Billy Budd is "ironic social criticism, ~ot 
3. 
acceptance." 8 
In this paper , I would like to take another look at the actions 
of Captain Vere, but instead of seeing them as Melville's final 
sociological statement about the justice or in justice of society 's 
forms and authority, I will examine Vere's actions as ontologically 
existential. Rathe r than seeing the actions of Vere as a comment 
by Melville about society's forms, I will trea t these actions as 
important because of what they reveal about man's ontological 
condition as described by Paul Tillich. 
There are several reasons for using Paul Ti llich's description 
of ontological anxiety9 to interpret the actions of Vere . 10 The 
first and most ovbious reason is simply that criticism need not 
follow the traditional line. I would like to offer au alternative 
to the traditional sociological approach to Dil ly Budd, though I 
would in no way suggest this past criticism is of no worth. In 
fact, past criticism supports my paper at many points , and 
traditional criticism's emphasis on social forms provides the 
basis for my second demonstration of the validity of using Tillich. 
That Vere is t aken t o be a man who advocates t he traditional forms 
of society and that these traditions are being threatened by mutiny 
and rebellion is obvious, and past criticism emphasizes the point . 
This sort of situation and its historical place in time are both 
seen by Tillich as a time in which ontological anxiety is at its 
peak; this existential condition of man is more obvious in the 
lives of men at this time than at any other time in history. 
Tillich describes the circumstances which lead to the rise of 
ontological anxiety. "The breakdown of absolutism, the development 
of liberalism and democracy, the rise of technical civilization 
4. 
with its victory over all enemies and its own beginning 
disintegration--thesc are the sociological presuppositions for the 
thi rd main period of anxiety . In this the anxiety of emptiness 
and meaninglessness is dominant ''(T61 ) . The r e is no doubt that 
Vere is a symbol of the aristocratic authoritarian . His background 
is one which elevates him in the hierarchy of society to a position 
which places him above the social status of his crew members , and 
he advocates the "controlled system of doctrines and sacramcnts 11 (T60) . 
The system of control that Til l ich describes makes up the past that 
"Starry Vere" belongs to, but the system is one which is breaking 
down , so Vere acts as a perfect example of a man who experiences 
the anxiety that Tillich describes . }ly third reason for using 
Till ich is that I am not alone in my view of the novel as a 
description of the breakdown of tl1e ontological structures of the 
past . Narlene Longenecker also makes this point . She writes, "By 
l ocating his drama in the midst of the French Revolution , Melville 
describes the death of a fragile but deliberate eighteenth century 
ontological security. 1111 Using Til l ich, I will be able to g ive a 
more co~plete and detailed description of that death and its effect 
on men , as exemplified in the case of Captain Vere . 
In the rest of this paper, I am going to suggest that the 
story Billy Budd and Vere's actions p r ovide a perfect example of 
the condition of men in the state of ontological anxiety as 
Ti l lich describes it . Anxiety arises when the spiritual contents 
of certain beliefs deteriorate slowly and unnoticed until a sudden 
shock occurs which causes the damn of ontological anxieties to 
break. The effects of this break (as Tillich describes them) are 
clearly seen through Vere's actions . I will begin the explanation 
~ 
., . 
of Vere's actions with an exegesis of Tillich's description of 
ontological anxiety, and I will then relate this dcscritpion to 
Vere's actions . In the final section of this paper I will make 
some concluding statements about Vere's actions and differences 
between my interpretation of these actions and the interpretations 
of past critics. 
II 
Tillich opens The Courage 'fo Be with a historical discussion 
of the relationship between courage and self- affirmation in the 
process of being . Tillich p oints out that if courage is used as 
the key to the interpretation of being-itself, what is found is 
"being and the negation of being and their unity"(T32) . Nonbeing 
6. 
is essential to any discussion of being because it is the denial of 
being. Throughout history, the subject of nonbeing has accompanied 
the discussion of being. Philosophers from Parmcnidies to Sartre 
have realized the importance of dealing in any serious ontological 
study with nonbeing. Nonbeing, for religion, has traditionally 
taken the form of the demonic or the experience of the transitoriness 
of the created world. Nonbeing is the denial of every concept, and 
it is that denial which is a part of all being, but which being 
seeks to overcome. Man is capable of standing outside his being , 
because of consciousness, and of seeking to affirm it, in spite of 
nonbeing, but in the consciousness of his need to affirm himself, 
he is aware of the denial of that affirmation, nonbeing. Man does 
not have what he seeks to affirm, and awareness of this fact is 
anxiety: " ••• anxiety is the existential awareness of nonbeing"(T35). 
Anxiety doesn't occur when man recognizes the condition of the 
transitoriness of the world or experiences death , but it occurs 
when man realizes the implications of these facts. What man 
realizes in anxiety is his~ finitude, and that he will one day 
be nothing beyond the grave . "Anxiety is finitude, experienced as 
one's. own finitude"(T35) . 
Tillich makes a distinction b etween fear and anxiety. "Fear, 
as opposed to anxiety, has a definite object (as most authors agree), 
7 . 
which can be faced, analyzed, attacked, endured''(T36) . Fear is 
conquerable, and anxiety is not. "But this is not so with anxiety, 
because anxiety has no objects , or rather, in a paradoxical phrase , 
its object is the negation of every object. Therefore participation, 
struggle, and love with respect to it are impossible . Ile who is in 
anxiety is, insofar as it is mere anxiety, delivered to it without 
help"(T36) . Tillich uses death as an example of this distinction. 
Death as an occurrence can be anticipated as a fear-- fear of the 
way we die or the !Jain involved . But the anxiety of den.th is the 
realization that nonbeing is awaiting man after death . Anxiety 
arises in fear of the unknown, against which there is no defense . 
In spite of the fact that fear and anxiety must be distinguished, 
they are closely related . "They are immanent within each other : 
The sting of fear is anxiety, and anxiety strives toward fear''(T37) . 
What Tillich means here is that in the fear of death anxiety arises 
as man realizes the hopelessness of his being after death , and this 
fear determines man's anxiety . In anxiety over a special situation 
(such as death as an event), anxiety about man's situation arises 
as man realizes he cannot preserve his own being . "In this moment, 
therefore, in which · 'naked anxiety' lays hold of the mind, the 
previous objects of fear cease to be definite objects"(T39). Dut 
man cannot endure this anxiety and must transfer it into an object 
to be feared so that he can confront it. "Anxiety strives to become 
fear, because fear can be met by couragc"(T39). Man's mind creates 
fears to escape God, who, by his divine nature, is the absolute 
threat to man ' s finite attempts at self- affirmation and cannot . be 
an object of fear . Man also attempts to escape the threat of non-
being . But all of these ittempts · are in vain, and at b~st, they 
8. 
serve to cover anxieties which will later return. The threat of 
nonbeing is not eliminated since it is inextricably part of finite 
being. 
Tillich points out two ontological facts about nonbeing which 
are important in his description of man ' s condition . First , 
nonbeing is logically dependent on being, no matter how much 
nonbeing seems victorious in its denial of man ' s self- affirmation. 
Nonbeing is ontologically dependent upon being because negation is 
not possible "without some prior affirmation to nego.te''(T40). 
Second , nonbeing takes on the qualities of the being negated, 
making it possible to speak of qual ities of nonbeing and different 
types of. anxiety. Nan depends on courage to be able to affirm his 
being ontically , spiritually, and morally, and corresponding to 
each of these three is a type of anxiety which threatens man ' s 
attempts at self- affirmation. Till ich points out that these 
anxieties are not meant to be viewed as forms of neurotic or 
psychotic anxiety, but they should be viewed existentially, as an 
essential part of existence and the mind in its normal state. 
Finally, before defining these three states of anxiety, he emphasizes 
the fact that though these states of anxiety are distinguishable, 
they are not separate, and they accompany each other in despair 
a l though one anxiety is usually dominant . 
The first anxiety described is that of ontic anxiety, the 
denial of self- affirmation by fate and death . "The anxiety of fate 
and death is most basic , most univers~l, and inescapable. All 
attempts to argue it away a re futile''(T42). All men are aware of 
their complete loss of self when their biological self ceases to 
function , and this t h reat is ever present , even though _men in 
9. 
society create psychological and ritual activities to overcome this 
anxiety. Ontic anxiety is caused by the awareness of death, the 
absolute threat to man's being, and fate, the relative threat to 
man's nonbeing. Anxiety of fate is caused when man recognizes the 
contingency of his existence in a particular place and time . 
Contingence is defined as the realization that the determining 
causes of man's existence have no ultimate necessity . "Fate is the 
rule of contingency, and the anxiety about fate is ba sed on the 
finite being's awareness of being contingent in every respect, of 
having no ultimate necessity''(T44). Death is ever p resent in man's 
mind and makes man anxious about his fate. Han, aware of his 
contingency, constantly suffers the denial of affirmation because 
of his finitude . 
•tan also suffers from spiritual anxiety . Just as nonbeing 
threatens man's physical existence, it threatens his creative 
s1>here of meaningfulness. Man does not need to be a genius to live 
creatively. He lives creatively when he responds to the meanings 
that culture gives to his life . As man responds to the art of 
culture or uses the language of the poet, he lives life creatively. 
Han loves himself as he participates in or create s the meanings of 
life, and he loves these meanings because they are his fulfillment 
and because these meanings are actualized through his participation 
in them . "He affirms himself as receiving and transforming reality 
creativoly"(T46). This is spiritual self-affirmation, and it 
presupposes that man's self- affirmation is an ultimate concern . 
It also presupposes that in and through this experience that there 
is an attempt to manifest ultimate reality. 
A man who does not experience spiritual self- affirmation is 
10. 
threatened by nonbeing in the forms of emptiness and meaninglessness. 
The absolute thr eat to man ' s spiritual self is meaninglessness and 
the relative threat is emptiness, but as in ontic anxiety, the 
absolute is ever present behind the relative . The anxiety of 
meaninglessness has its source in the loss of an ultimate concern 
or a "meaning which gives meaning to all meanings"(T47) . The 
anxiety of emptiness is aroused when the beliefs which man has 
affirmed are shattered. The meanings of life that culture has 
given begin to lose their meaning or content. When present culture 
fails to provide man with content, he realizes the loss of a 
spiritual center, and this s ituation cannot be remedied by the 
intentional production of a new center. All such attenpts only 
lead to deeper despair . "The anxiety of emptiness drives us to the 
abyss of meaninglessness"(T48) . 
The emptiness and loss of meaning that man experiences in 
these situations are expressions of the threat of nonbeing to his 
spiritual self-affirrration. This threat is expressed in man 's 
doubt about his spiritual life. Doubt is a part of one ' s spiritual 
life, but when total doubt takes over, tl1e threat of nonbcing 
swallows the awareness of having a spiritual meaning and leaves only 
the feeling of not having, the experience of existential despair . 
As man becomes aware of his not having, the s piritual life struggles 
to maintn.in itself in spite of the doubt "by clinging to affirmations 
which are not yet undercut , be they tradition, autonomous convictions, 
or emotional preferences"(T48- 9). If these attempts fail man finds 
himself separated from the whole of reality, cut off from universal 
participation and isolated because of his doubt . As a result, he 
seeks to locate spiritual meaning by sacrificing his syiritun.l 
11. 
freedom to fanatical causes. "He flees from his freedom of asking 
and answering for himself to a si_tuation in which no further 
questions can be asked and the answers to previous questions are 
imposed upon him authoritatively"(T49). He docs this in a des1)erate 
attempt to salvage his spiritual life, but the oeaning he finds 
costs him his individuality as he participates in the group cause. 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important to realize 
that spiritual anxiety arises not only from personal doubt, but 
also from the failure of the spiritual contents of past systems 
(once thought to be ultimate) to account for or express the human 
situation and answer questions of existence. Tillich argues that 
this is largely the case with the doctrinal symbols of Christianity. 
This failure also occurs as a result of the actual conditions of 
the present being different from those of the period in which the 
spiritual contents are created. A sudden shock brings the slow 
waste of these contents to man's awareness and the anxiety of 
meaninglessness sets in. It is also important to keep in mind that 
the loss of man's ability to shape and understa nd reality not only 
causes spiritual anxiety, but results in ontic anxiety as well. 
Any threat to man's spiritual being is a threat to his whole being. 
Besides ontic and spiritual anxiety, Tillich describes a third 
anxiety, moral anxiety, which arises from the fact that man's ontic 
and spiritual being are not only given to him, but are demanded of 
him. Man asks himself what he has made of his ontic and spiritual 
being in his awareness of his being, and as his own judge, he 
stands against himself. "This situation produces the anxiety which, 
in relative terms is the anxiety of guilt; in absolute terms, the 
anxiety of self-rejection or condemnation"(T51-2). Nan is free to 
12. 
determine his destiny, to determine his being ontically and 
spiritually, and his actions of moral self-affirmation contribute 
to the determination of his being. But no matter how he tries, 
none of his moral acti ons is perfect; he can never fulfill his 
destiny to the point of satisfying the ethical norms established by 
philosophy and religion becasue nonbeing, which is ever present, 
prevents his actions from being perfect. "A profound ambiguity 
between good and evil permeates everything he does because it 
permeates his personal being as such''(T52). Nonbcing is mixed with 
his being in moral self--affirmation, and this ambiguity leads man 
to judge himself as guilty. This guilt begins to show itself 1n 
every moment of moral self-awareness and drives man to complete 
self-rejection, the despair of having lost or of not having 
fulfilled his destiny. 
Tillich's description of man's rcation t·o this situation is 
ess .ential to my thesis. "To avoid this extreme situation man tries 
to transform the anxiety of guilt into moral action regardless of 
its imperfection and ambiguity"(T53). He does this by taking 
nonbeing into his moral self-affirmation in two ways with "the first 
based on the contingencies of fate, the second on the responsibility 
of freedom. The first way can lead to defiance of negative 
judgements and the moral demands on which they are bnsed; the second 
way can lead to a moral rigor and the self-satisfaction derived 
from it''(T5}). And, as in the two previous anxieties, Tillich 
emphasizes the fact that moral anxiety can be distinguished from 
antic and spiritual anxiety, but that they are inextricably 
interrelated. The threat of fate and death awakens the guilt of 
moral failure in man, and this guilt can reciprocally destroy man's 
.i...). 
ontic foundation. Likewise, even though man can save himself from 
spi ritual emptiness by the "call to duty" affirmed by the moral 
se l f , spiritual doubt can cause the fee l ing of moral guilt and lead 
to despair "by throwing into the abyss of skepticism not onl y every 
mor al principle but the meaning of moral self- affirmation as 
such"(T54). 
Tillich concludes his description of the anxieties by linking 
them with despair . "All of them and their underlying unity are 
existential , i . e . , they are implied in the existence of man as man, 
h i s finitude, and his estrangement"(T54) . They are fulfilled in 
despair of the "boundary situation," the situation of no hope. In 
depsai r, man feels nonbeing to be v i ctorious, but feeling presupposes 
be i ng , enough being to feel the power of nonbeing and to lenve man 
in t he despair of despair . The pain of despair comes when man 
realizes he cannot affirm himself in the face of nonbeing, and the 
r eaction to this pain is usually the desire of the being to get rid 
of itself . But moral anxiety or guilt always prevent man from 
committing suicide as he realizes the moral failure of b e i ng imp lied 
in suicide . In the f ace of meaninglessness, ontic exit p resents 
itse l f, but guilt always prevents man from taking this way out. 
Tillich points out that it is no wonder that in the face of this 
despair man spends his life in a continuous effort to avoid despair . 
Extreme situations of despair are not u stlally reached because man 
f inds concerns in which he can affirm h i mself spiritually and 
morally and overcome , for a time, ontic anxiety . But because they 
lack ultimacy , the attempts to overcome anxiety must fail , 
especially in times of change in the structure of society when men 
intentionally try to find a spiritual center . It is in this 
14. 




Although Tillich has pointed out that no one anxiety is felt 
alone, he states that in any given age one anxiety is usually 
predominant and brings on the others. Ile breaks the past ages down 
and lists them according to the anxiety which is predominant at 
that time . Tillich decides that with t he breakdown of the 
hierarchical structures of. the 18th century and with the ri se in 
liberalism and democracy , a l oss of spiritual content resulted. 
With this los s , there was, and there still is today, a ri se in 
spiritual anxiety as the predominant anxiety . It is in this 
setting that the Billy Budd story takes p lace. The traditions of 
Britain are breaking down, and this is especial l y experienced in 
the navy, traditional ly England's primary mi litary strength. The 
navy is short on men , and prisoners from the jails are forced into 
service alongside the r egular navy men. "Insolvent debtors of 
minor grade , together with the promiscuous lame ducks of morality , 
found the navy a convenient and secure rcfuge ••• " (HS65). Besides 
the ranks being filled with criminals forced into service , the navy 
is r ife with discontent which threatens to lead to mutiny. In 
fact, mutiny actually flared forth in the Spithead and Nore cases . 
The effect of these mutinies on England is exactly the same effect 
as that which Til lich describes when he writes about the decline of 
absolutism . 
It !}:he Great Mutiny] was indeed a demonstra tion more 
menacing to England than the contemporary manifestoes 
and conquering and proselyting armies of the French 
Directory. To the British Empi re the Nore Mutiny was 
what a strike in the fire brigade would be to London 
threatened by general arson(ilS54)~ 
This is the ~orld of threatened val ues in which Vere is captain of 
16. 
the ship Bellipotent . 
Captain Vere is a military man "thoroughly versed in the 
science of his profession." He is an "unobtrusive" man, a modest 
man of the "higher nobility" who suggests an "aristocratic 
v irtue " (1IS60) . He is a traditionalist and a po.rt of the absolutist 
world that is breaking down , though he shelters himself from 
admitting this by certain settled convictions about the world: 
His settled convictions were as a dike against those 
invading waters of novel opinion social, political, 
and otherwise, which carri ed away as in a torrent no 
few minds in those days , minds by nature not inferior 
to his own . While other members of that aristocracy 
to which ~y birth he belonged were incensed at the 
innovators mainly because their theories were inimical 
to the privileged c l asses , Captain Vere disinterestedly 
oppossed them not alone because they seemed to him 
insusceptible of embodiment in l asting institutions , 
but at war with the peace of the world and the true 
welfare of mankind(HS62- 63). 
I t is obvious f r om this passage that Vere firmly hopes to maintain 
his aristocratic heritage , that heritage which Till i ch describes as 
spiritually bankrupt following the rise of liberal ism and democ r :1.cy 
(see T61). The spiritual content of Vere ' s heritage is slowl y 
losing its meaningfulness, and when Vere recognizes the deterioration 
of its meaningfulness in a sudden glimpse, the results a r c 
dis astrous . The "unnoticeable" deterioration is "realized with 
a shock as it progresses," and it produces "the anxiety of 
meaninglessness at its end"(T50) . Vere, by i gnoring the emptying 
out of the spiritual cont ents of the aristocratic society, has set 
himself up for the shock of spiritual anxi ety and the despair of 
the "boundary situation ." He experiences this shock when Billy 
kills Claggart . 
A desc r iption of Billy and Cl aggart he l ps to make c l ear the 
17. 
source of the s p iritual anxiety that he exp eriences. Billy, 
throughout the story, is marked for his ex.ceptionally noble makeup. 
Both physically and morally he is almost beyond reproach. He does 
not have the "sinister" in him, and he is 11 one to whom not yet has 
been proffered the questionable a1)ple of lmowledge 11 (HS52). He 
gives no offense to anyone, and instead on the Rights, he was ''like 
a Catholic priest striking peace in an Irish shindy"(IIS47). Billy 
is a naively simple character whose qualities are closely related 
to divine goodness. Vere goes so far as to call him an angel. 
Claggart, on the other hand, is the opposite of all these 
qualities. "Now something such an one was Claggart, in whom was 
the mania of an evil nature, not engendered by vicious training or 
corrupting books or licentious living, but born with him and innate, 
in short 'a depravity according to nature'"(HS76). There are 
several references to him as a serpent(HS52) who cannot stand Billy 
because of his innocence . He is "the direct reverse of a Saint! 11 (HS74) 
and the direct opposite of Billy. 
The religious implications of these two characters are obvious. 
Billy represents absolute good and Claggart absolute evil. This 
distinction fits perfectly into the aristocratic world view of Vere . 
What I am ~uggesting is that the aristocracy is part of the 
traditional religious heritage of the chain of being (or the beliefs 
of the aristocracy centered around traditional world view based on 
the chain of being) in which good and evil are two distinct worlds, 
and this heritage is an ultimate concern for Vere. This traditional 
world view, which distinguishes good as the upper part of the chain 
and evil as the lower part, makes up part of the spiritual content 
which has kept Vere from experiencing spiritual anxiety. 
18. 
When Claggart comes to Vere with his tale of Billy's mutiny, 
Vere decides to handle the situation in his very self-assured, 
aristcratic manner. He is sure that Claggart is lying. "With gray 
eyes impatient and distrustful essaying to fathom to the bottom 
Claggart•s calm violent ones, Captain Vere again heard him out ••• " 
(HS96). The Captain is quite sure that Dilly is innocent and thinks 
of him as "a King's bargain." The solution to the problem seems to 
be to bring "good" and "evil" face to face to test the accuser, and 
them in an "undemonstrative way" close the affair. But to Vere's 
surprise, the bringing together of "good" and ."evil 11 not only 
backfires, but it also brings on in Vere the ontological despair 
that Tillich describes. 
When Dilly is faced with Claggart's charge, his fateful 
stammering is the result. Vere realizes the difficulty that Billy 
is having, and confident of the goodness of Billy, he tries to 
soothe him. But Vere's ''fatherly" attempt has the opposite effect 
on Billy, who is not soothed, and who instead kills Claggart. In 
the killing of Claggart, not only is Vere's self-confidence rattled 
as he witnesses the extremely harsh failure of his attempt to 
soothe Billy, but what is more shocking to Vere is the blurring of 
the tradi tiomil distinctions between good and evil when 11 ••• innocence 
and guilt personified in Claggart and Dudd in effect changed places" 
(HS103). The result is that when the spiritual content of his 
heritage is challenged, Vere experiences the anxiety of spiritual 
meaninglessness. No longer is the distinction between good and 
evil (the distinction which is taught by the notion of the chain of 
being) so clear in Vere's aristocratic mind. 
Tillich describes how one anxiety accompanies or causes another, 
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and Vere fits the description as he experiences ontic anxiety at 
nearly the same moment . After lifting the dead body of Claggart off 
the floor, the sudden flash of the anxiety of nonbeing hits Vere. 
Ile experiences that flash of horror which Tillich says men can only 
stand for short periods of time, and the change in him is drastic . 
Retaining erectness , Captain Vere with one hand covering 
his face stood to all appearance as impassive as the 
object at his feet. Was he absorbed in taking in all the 
bearings of the event and what was best not only now at 
once to be done, but also in the sequel? Slowly he 
uncovered his face; and t he affect was as if the moon 
emerging from eclipse should reappear with quite another 
aspect than that which had gone into hiding"(HS99- 100) . 
What emerges from hiding from Vere is a military legalism in 
the form of a direct command to Billy. In the face of ontic 
anxiety, Vere realizes his lack of moral self-affirmation, which 
amounts to a denial of his freedom to fulfill his destiny. This 
moral anxiety produces a feeling of guilt in him which he seeks to 
overcome by transformation of guilt into "moral action regardless 
of its imperfection or ambiguity"(T53) . When Vere comes away from 
his meeting with his nonbeing, he acts immediately . "The father in 
him, manifested towards Billy thus far in the scene, wa s replac ed 
by the military disciplinarian . In his of ficial tone he bade the 
foretopman retire to a stateroom aft (pointing it out), and there 
remain till thence summoned" (IISlOO) . 
This sudden return to militarism is a typical respons e for men 
in Vere ' s position, according to Tillich, since one cannot f a ce 
..1.nxiety t oo long . The actions of Vere which follow :ire typica l, 
in that Vere tri e s to insulate himself from all three types of 
anxiety. His fi r st action is devised to attu.ck the anxiety of 
meaninglessness, and it helps Vere r e- establish his s piritual center 
in the face of doubt. " On the way to this situation (!he situation 
in which the spiritual life is threatened by doubi} the spiritual 
life tries to maintain itself as long as possibl e by clinging to 
affirmations which are not yet undercut, be they traditions, 
autonomous convictions , or emotional preferences"(T48- 9) . Ve r e 
tries to cling to the tradition of militarism in an attempt to 
maintain his spiritual center which is threatened by Bi lly's actions, 
when good and evil change places . Thinking of Claggart, he exclai ms , 
"Struck dead by o.n angel of God! Yet the angel must hang"(HS101 ). 
Militarism also a llows Vere the opportunity to maintain 
himself against mo r a l anxiety, by a series of orders and moral 
actions , such as the drum-head court . He tries to avoid the despair 
of moral anxiety of having lost his destiny in two ways, exactly as 
Tillich describes . Realizing the contingencies of h is fate, Vere 
proceeds with the drum- head court in defiance of negative judgments 
of the officers and the moral demands which they are based on. As 
C. B. Ives has clearly pointed out, Vere acted in defiance of the 
legal demands of the si tuation. Rathe r than holding Billy for 
trial by the admiral, he misused the Articles of War as an excuse 
f . d' t t· 1 2 or 1mme 1a e ac ion. The doctor and the officers believe the 
drum-head court is wrong because it goes against ordinary mi litary 
handling of such situations. "In obedience to Captain Ve r e , he 
~he docto~ communicated what had h appened to the lieutenants and 
captain of marines , saying nothing as to the captain ' s state . They 
fully shared his own surprise and concern. Like him too, t hey 
seemed t o think that such a matter should be r eferred to the 
admiral"(HS102) . Not only did they think his actions were wrong, 
they expressed their objections t o the Captain by po inting out 
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that Billy meant neither mutiny nor murder and by asking that tl1e 
death sentence be mitigated, but neither objection had any effect 
on Vere's determination . 
The attempt to overcome moral anxiety is seen in its second 
form, too, as a sudden rise in legalism or mo ral rigor. When Vere 
realizes that the other office rs believe that Billy is innocent 
before God, he calls it nature, but he insists that their allegence 
is not owed to nature, but to the King and his laws no matter what 
they require. "For the law and the rigor of it, we are not 
responsible. Our vowed responsibility is in this: That however 
pitilessly the law may operate in any instances, we nevertheless 
adhere to it and administer it"(HS110) . This moral rigor works to 
satisfy Vere's need to ac t in the face of his responsibility to his 
moral freedom. By emphasising the law of tl1e King and the fact that 
h e acts according to it, he fulfills his need to a.ct according to 
accepted norms even though he defies the norms of military law by 
invoking the drum-head court. He is caught in the paradoxical 
situation that Tillich describes in which men act in contradiction . 
Vere feels both the need to strike out against the contingencies of 
his fate by denying certain norms, but t hen he feels he must act 
in some way according to society's norms because he still recognizes 
his obligat ion to affirm himself morally. Dut what Tillich says 
happens to men in this condition is that when they try to affirm 
themselves morally, they take the attempt to extremes. Vere acts 
extremely when he enforces the legal rigor of the King's navy 
"prompted by duty and the law"(HS113). He temporarily satisfies 
his need for moral affirmation by his second act even if it 
contradicts his denial of military law earlier. 
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Finally, Vere confronts ontic anxiety by reducing the threat 
of nonbeing (as Tillich describes) to fear in an object. He 
reduces ontic anxiety to fear of mutiny. By treating Billy as a 
mutineer, Vere reduces the source of his ontic anxiety to an object 
which can be feared. When Billy's actions are reduced to something 
to be feared , Vere's anxiety can be confronted and overcome. "We 
proceed under the law of the Mutiny Act"(HS111). In his 
determination to overcome his ontic anxiety by reducing it to fear 
of mutiny , he prejudges Billy. All the jurors recognize the 
prejudice. This recognition and the jurors recognition of Billy's 
essential innocence prove the determination of Vere to overcome 
ontic anxiety. The quick judgment of Billy also helps Vere to 
conquer fear of mutiny that would arise if Billy wasn't condemned. 
"You know what sailors are. Will they not revert to the recent 
outbreak of Nore? Ay"(HS112). 
That Vere was in a state of anxiety is seen by those around 
him. The doctor realizes the condition is not necessarily madness. 
"No more trying situation is conceivable than that of an officer 
subordinate under a captain whom he suspects to be not mad indeed, 13 
but yet not quite unaffected in his intellects"(HS102). Reading 
Tillich shows that Vere is manifesting a man's shock at recognizing 
his own nonbeing, not a psychotic condition, and that his actions 
are attempts to overcome it . This is a normal state for all men 
because it is a part of being . But because it is a part of being, 
it can not be overcome, and all Vere's attempts to overcome it by 
affirming himself spiritually through militarism must fail. This 
militarism, as a part of the aristocratic order, was wasting away 
as a spiritual content and did not (and never could) offer 
2) . 
ultimate answers. Tillich po ints out that attempts to intentionally 
produce new spiritual centers, or to continue with old ones in the 
face of doubt about part of the center, are doomed to fail ''and the 
attempt to produce it only produces deeper anxie~y"(T48) . This 
deeper anxiety is seen by the others as Vere emerges from Billy's 
compartment after telling Billy the decisions of the court . "The 
face he 1=the first lieutenaniJ beheld, for the moment one expressive 
of the agony of the strong, was to the officer, though a man of 
fifty, a startling revelation. That the condemned one suffered 
less than he who mainly had effected the condemnation was apparently 
indicated by the farmer's exclamation in th scene soon perforce to 
be touched on"(IIS115). Vere's spiritual anxiety is not overcome, 
as it cannot be, and he finds himself deeper in despair than he 
had been previously . He has sacrificed his self to militarism, a 
concern which is not ultimate and cannot eliminate anxiety because 
it does not truly affirm his being in the face of nonbeing. Ile 
suffers moral despair also since his emphasis on legalism did not 
cover up the guilt of his failure to fulfill himself ontically and 
spiritually. The nature of his death seems appropriate for a man 
who found spiritual meaningfulness in the forms of the 18th century. 
He dies from a wound received in battle with the Atheist. And as 
he dies, it is clear he has not overcome the anxiety of meeting with 
Billy Budd. The drug that soothes his body mysteriously activates 
"the subtler element" in Vere , and he dies calling out to Billy. 
What I have attempted to show is the ontological anxiety that 
Vere, in the meeting with nonbeing, must endure. The ontological 
anxiety in Vere's situntion follows directly from the combination 
of changes in the philosophical and religious thought lrl1ich 
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determines the thinking of culture by interpreting tl1e world and 
its meaning and from Vere's sudden awareness of the lack of ultimacy 
in his forms. As the forms break down, so does the spiritual 
content which makes up Vere's spiritual center, and witl1 the loss 
of his spiritual center, Vere ends in the anxiety of despair. 
Tillich's description of ontological anxiety provides a perfect 
explanation of Vere's character and his actions. 
25. 
IV 
At t his point, I am in a much better position tho.n I was before 
beginning to discuss Dilly Budd and Tillich's thought to make some 
statements about my interpretation of Billy Budd and its relationship 
to past criticism. The first point that I would like to make is in 
reference to the much disputed Preface which Hayford and Sealts 
dismiss, claiming that it is not a part of the sto;ry as Melville 
intended it. According to them, Mrs . Melville's comments on the 
14 three sheets led to the use of these as the preface to the story. 
Nany critics have taken advantn.ge of this misuse of the preface ( if 
it is a misus.e) by other critics to dismiss their theories . William 
Stafford believes that even if Melville had taken out the preface, 
the story is a better one with the preface as a part of it and that 
Melville would probably have used the prefa ce in the final draft. 15 
As far as my paper is concerned, it supports Stufford's contention. 
In the preface, Melville speaks of the same breakdown in traditional 
hierarchy that Tillich describes : 
The year 1797, the year of this narrative, belongs to a 
period which, as every thinker now feels, invol~red a 
crisis for Christendom not exceeded in its undetermined 
momentousness at the time by any other era whereof there 
is record . The opening proposition made by the spirit 
of the Age involve16rectification of the Old World's hereditary wrongs . 
Whether the preface belongs or not does not hinder the validity of 
my paper, but my thesis does provide a place for it. 
It should also be more clear by now the place my paper has in 
relation to past criticism of Billl ~ · Both of the traditional 
streams of criticism, acceptance and irony, take society's forms to 
be the central importance to Melville , and depending upon the 
thinking of the critic , they decide whether Helville ~pproved Vere's 
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actions or not. The interpretation that I have arrived at by using 
Tillich is more existential. While the forms of society are 
important in my interpretation, what is the catalyst to Vere's 
actions are not the forms, but is instead Vere's confrontation with 
his nonbeing . Ontological anxiety is the source of Vere's actions, 
even though I agree with other critics that Vere did attempt to 
preserve the forms or his spiritual content . What is important to 
my interpretation is not whether or not the forms survive (which 
they can not according to Tillich), or ~e lville's mo ral decision 
about the subject, but instead the effect on Vere wl1en these forms 
are challenged. 
There are two valua ble reasons for interpreting Dilly Budd 
this way . The first is that as a result of this interpretation, 
readers can more easily understand Vere and the situation he is in. 
If readers accept Tillich's description of ontological anxiety as 
existential (a part of their being), then the story and Vere's 
situation (the feeling of anxiety) is more meaningful and J>ersonal 
than a story which is simply concerned with whether or not Melville 
accepted the forms of society. At some time in our lives, we all 
suffer the anxiety that Vere suffers because we share in being. 
The second reason that this interpretation is valuable is that 
it shows Billy lludd to be a more artistically constructed story. 
Instead of being expected to sympathize with Billy, a flnt cl1aracter, 
we sympathize with Vere in his moral dilemma. His life becomes the 
tragedy that l3illy' s life never could become due to the fact thn,t 
Billy's character is so innocent, and as a result, is a character 
that ,is alien · to lllelville's readers. In empathy with Vere, we take 
a different view of Vere and his actions, and he is noi seen as the 
ogre that the irony critics claim him to be. The reader has a 
better story which is more relative to his life because Vere is a 
real character with whom to identify and empathize; the reader is 
no longer forced to feel sorry for the celestial Billy. Ny 
interpretation says more for Melville's power as an artist. The 
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f~ct that Melville's character, Captain Ver~ acts as Tillich observes 
real (tormented) men to act in times of social and personal crisis 
is a remarkable demonstration of Melville's extraordinary skill as 
both observer and artist. And the fact that this interpretation 
makes the story more personal to the reader and a better piece of 
art may be the most compelling reasons to accept it. 
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